The consensus dilemma: federalism and negotiation in brazilian educational policy

Abstract

This article analyzes the adequacy of the consensus-based decision-making model adopted by the Permanent Body for Negotiation and Federative Cooperation (Instância Permanente de Negociação e Cooperação Federativa), a central entity in the coordination of educational policies in Brazil. Drawing upon a theoretical review of cooperative federalism, negotiation theory, and veto player systems—alongside a documentary analysis of meeting minutes and legislation enacted for the National Education System (SNE)—the study investigates whether consensus serves as an effective mechanism for implementing equitable policies or, conversely, represents an obstacle to innovation. This qualitative and dialectical research confronts the regulatory framework with deliberative practice, examining the impact of the federative entities' veto power and the propensity for the "joint-decision trap." Finally, it proposes a reflection on the necessity of establishing a binding obligation and a subsidiary decision-making criterion as a means to strengthen the collaboration regime within the Brazilian educational system.