The problem of envy in ideal and nonideal theory

Abstract

In recent years, scholars have explored the potential of John Rawls’s concept of excusable envy as a source of motivation for building fairer societies. However, I argue that these scholars overlook Rawls’s conceptual account of envy and the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory in A Theory of Justice. Consequently, they unintentionally rely on a thesis that Rawls aimed to distance his theory from: the notion that equality is a product of envy. Additionally, I engage with critics of Rawls who claim that his treatment of the problem of envy is inadequate. They assert that the least advantaged individuals often assess their societal position based on merit rather than legitimate expectations, which can lead to envy and destabilize a well-ordered society. I assert that while this criticism cannot impact Rawls’s ideal theory, it offers an unintended contribution to nonideal theory. To enrich this perspective, I briefly consider the psychology not only of the least advantaged but also of the most advantaged members of society. By delving into this matter, I aim to illuminate the ongoing theoretical debate and provide insights into the ways we can transition to a more just society.