Interactional Dynamics and Expectations as Predictors of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/1982-4327e3632Keywords:
cooperative behavior, child, prisoner dilemma, decision makingAbstract
Children's cooperation has been investigated through games that present dilemmas to understand how children make decisions in interactive situations. The aim of the study was to investigate the cooperative behavior of 75 children (52% girls) aged 6 to 11, their justifications for their decisions, and their expectations regarding a game partner. Cooperation was assessed using the digital games Slingshot Challenge and Star Mines, which were structured as Prisoner's Dilemma games and played in both public and private contexts. Verbal responses were subjected to content analysis, and the data were analyzed using inferential statistics. The results indicated an association between children's expectations regarding their partners, their justifications, and their behavior, such that those who expected cooperation cooperated more. It is concluded that cooperative behavior in childhood is dynamic and contextual, with children demonstrating adaptive flexibility in interactional dynamics.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Emanuella Ribeiro Félix, Leonardo Rodrigues Sampaio, Guilherme Ribeiro Eulálio Cabral

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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The research data is available on demand, condition justified in the manuscript


