How much does lobbying matter in a constituent assembly? Indigenous lobbying and the constitutionalization of social rights in Venezuela in 1999

Abstract

This article presents the first results of an investigation into the constitutional outcomes of the Bolivarian processes in Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009). It examines the Venezuelan case, asking to what extent the organized action of the indigenous lobby moved the constitutional text closer to its preferences. The strategy combines the Constitutional Social Score Model (CSSM), preference-attainment analysis, and process tracing. The documentary chain distinguishes the CONIVE proposal, which predates the Constituent Assembly, as the lobby's preference (y = 6.17); Hugo Chávez's proposal of August 1999 as a proxy for the initial position of the majority coalition (5.00); the text approved by Commission 16 (6.67); and the promulgated Constitution (8.50). LI is calculated in two stages, with the baseline redefined in the second: LI(t¹) = +0.67 and LI(t²) = −1.83; applied to the process as a whole, it yields LI(ttl) = −1.16. The first value indicates convergence toward the indigenous preference; the remaining ones indicate overshooting on a scale of normative density, rather than the loss of demanded content. The gain observed in the first stage is concentrated in the institutional-design subgroups, and the interval between the committee text and promulgation remains documentarily incomplete.