Diagonal accountability for the control of corruption: citizen oversight initiative in Ecuador

Abstract

Latin America has made progress in implementing regulations to include civil society in corruption control. One of these mechanisms of social accountability (SAcc) is the citizen oversight initiative (COI). However, the conditions necessary for its effectiveness beyond legal recognition are not clear in the literature. We argue that COIs and SAcc in general are more effective when they are not over-institutionalized and when horizontal accountability works effectively. This study examines the effects of the institutionalization of COIs and their outcomes through an in-depth qualitative case study of Ecuador. This case is particularly relevant for analyzing COIs as a mechanism of social accountability, given the institutionalization of this type of initiative and the creation of oversight agencies to ensure participatory governance. The qualitative analysis reveals that, while institutionalization makes COIs possible, it may also undermine their capacity to hold the state accountable by multiplying veto points, prolonging procedures, weakening inter-agency coordination, and neutralizing alerts before they result in sanctions. In weak institutional contexts, where oversight agencies fail to respond in a timely manner or do not impose adequate sanctions, these mechanisms lose legitimacy and have a limited impact on corruption control. The study thus highlights the paradox of institutionalization.