The Effects of Reelection on Municipal Policy: Evidence from Close Elections in Brazil

Abstract

Introduction: The possibility of reelection is often associated with greater accountability and administrative continuity, but it can also create short-term incentives and encourage the strategic use of public resources. This article examines the causal effects of mayoral reelection on the allocation and quality of municipal public policies in Brazil, contributing to the broader debate on the institutional consequences of local electoral competition. Materials and methods: The study employs a regression discontinuity design (RDD) applied to municipal elections decided by narrow margins between 2000 and 2020. This quasi-experimental approach compares municipalities where incumbents narrowly won or lost – by margins of up to two percentage points – allowing for estimation of the local average treatment effect of reelection. The analysis draws on budgetary, education, and health data from SIOPS, SIOPE, and Finanças do Brasil (FINBRA), combined with electoral data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Estimates were obtained through weighted local polynomial regressions, with robustness checks based on alternative bandwidths, continuity tests for covariates, and placebo tests. Results: The findings suggest that reelected mayors tend to replicate the spending patterns of their first term, concentrating resources in highly visible areas such as public works and social assistance, but without producing significant gains in education or health outcomes. Reelection therefore appears to reinforce conservative budgeting practices while constraining administrative innovation. Discussion: The findings indicate that while reelection promotes political continuity, it does not necessarily lead to more effective governance. By favoring electorally advantageous expenditures and shying away from structural reforms, reelected mayors tend to undermine their municipality’s capacity for long-term planning and coordination. Reelection thus operates as an ambivalent mechanism: providing stability while perpetuating management practices aimed at retaining power rather than achieving sustainable public outcomes.