Why reform Electoral Financing? Causes and consequences of electoral self-financing regulation in Brazil

Abstract

Introduction: In this paper, I discuss the causes of the electoral financing reform in Brazil, carried out in 2019, which restricted the limits of candidates' self-financing, as well as its consequences in the 2020 municipal elections. Methodology: I use mixed methods, starting from analysis of the evolution of legislative changes related to the financing of elections in Brazil (from redemocratization to 2019). I use documents sources, parliamentary speeches in the Chamber of Deputies in times of reforms, roll-call voting data in the Chamber of Deputies and information on electoral funding of candidates in the 2016 and 2020 municipal elections. Consideration of the causes of change: H1 test, documents are used; in H2, parliamentary speeches and roll-call votes are considered (binary logistic regression analysis). Consideration of the consequences of change: both in testing H3 and H4, quantitative methods are used (linear regression, 2SLS and logistic regression). Results: of the four initially postulated hypotheses: (H1) the regulation of self-financing in Brazil is related to electoral results after the ban on business donations. (H2) The vote to tighten the limits on self-financing, through Law No. 13,878/2019, was mediated by the level of self-financing of federal deputies. (H3) The limitation of self-financing had a positive impact on electoral competition. Moreover, (H4) self-financing has become a less important resource for incumbents in 2020, when compared to 2016. Only H2 is not empirically confirmed. Discussion: The results denote, first, that the limitation of self-financing was a reaction to the increase of this type of resource in electoral competition; and that this change had a significant effect on increasing electoral competition.