The Paradox of Digital Self-Suffiency in Foreign Policy and Cyber Defense Amid Technological Dependence in Brazil

Abstract

This study falls within the broad area of Strategic Studies and International Security, focusing on cyberspace defense. Although the literature widely debates cyber securitization, there is a scarcity of analyses on the institutional frictions generated by imposing analog military defense logics on civilian digital infrastructures, especially in peripheral countries. This research fills this gap by investigating the Brazilian case, contrasting the centralized defense governance model with the technical and market reality of the private sector. The objective is to analyze how the Brazilian grand strategy model, guided by the rhetorical pursuit of "strategic autonomy" and institutional militarization, impacts the practical protection of critical infrastructures operated by the civilian sector. As for methodology, the process tracing method is used in association with systematic documentary analysis. Data collection was based on high-level primary sources, including the 2025 editions of the National Defense Policy and Strategy, the National Defense White Paper (2024), the Military Cyber Defense Doctrine (2023), and minutes from the National Critical Infrastructure Security Committee. The results show a structural design flaw: by delegating network control to the military establishment, the State generates a severe operational mismatch with the corporations that sustain essential services, a scenario worsened by chronic foreign technological dependence. It is concluded that the militarization of governance and the isolated strategy of self-sufficiency paradoxically result in greater systemic vulnerability, demanding an urgent transition to a cooperative civil-military-private model.