THE POST-PANDEMIC BILL: MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS AND INCUMBENT PUNISHMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA

Abstract

This article investigates the determinants of the high rate of presidential turnover in South America between 2020 and 2025, a period in which ten of the eleven elections resulted in the incumbent’s defeat. The objective is to test whether electoral punishment was a response to objective macroeconomic performance (retrospective economic voting) or to the electorate’s subjective political perceptions. Using data from the World Bank, ECLAC, and Latinobarómetro, we estimated Firth-corrected logistic regression models, appropriate for the small sample size (11 observations) and the risk of near-perfect separation in the dependent variable. The results show an inconsistent pattern: the intention to vote for the opposition is significantly correlated with the incumbent’s defeat. Objective macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, unemployment, and GDP were not statistically significant in any specification. We conclude that the findings are exploratory in nature but suggest that political perception precedes economic punishment during the period; however, they do not allow for a definitive causal assertion, pointing to the need for larger samples in future research.