Preprint / Version 1

COALITION WITHOUT “COALITION PRESIDENTIALISM,” DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND EXECUTIVE–LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE 2019 PENSION REFORM

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/SciELOPreprints.13318

Keywords:

pension reform, coalition presidentialism, outsiders

Abstract

This article analyzes the approval of the 2019 Pension Reform at a singular moment in Brazilian democracy, when the political architecture anchored in coalition presidentialism was put to the test. The objective is to demonstrate how governability was produced within the Chamber of Deputies, under the leadership of its Speaker, who structured a legislative coalition capable of advancing the reform on its own terms. As a method, we employ process tracing, drawing on official documents, scholarly production, and major news outlets to reconstruct the decision-making process and map actors, incentives, and vetoes. The evidence indicates that, amid low executive coordination, committees, the college of party leaders, and rapporteurs acted as veto players, removing or softening provisions with greater regressive impact (pension capitalization, extensive deconstitutionalization, automatic inclusion of states and municipalities, and changes to the BPC [Continuous Cash Benefit] and rural retirement), while preserving distributive safeguards. The final text secured expressive majorities, The final text secured expressive majorities, the result of coordination within the Chamber of Deputies that reconciled fiscal constraints with the protection of vulnerable groups. Three elements reinforce the argument: parliamentary blocs formalized as internal power arrangements – distinct from a governing coalition; episodes of asserted autonomy, such as approval of the mandatory budget; and the role of committees, party leaders, and rapporteurs as decision filters. The conclusions indicate that, in contexts of low presidential coordination, legislative coalitions can provide governability for the policy agenda, modulate distributive costs, and reconfigure – albeit temporarily – the relationship between branches. In short, governability emerged as an endogenous product of the Chamber of Deputies – where the scope and contours of the reform were ultimately defined.

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Submitted

09/10/2025

Posted

09/12/2025

How to Cite

COALITION WITHOUT “COALITION PRESIDENTIALISM,” DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND EXECUTIVE–LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE 2019 PENSION REFORM. (2025). In SciELO Preprints. https://doi.org/10.1590/SciELOPreprints.13318

Section

49th Annual ANPOCS Meeting

Plaudit

Data statement

  • The research data is contained in the manuscript